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The La Línea tunnel is one of the largest civil works projects ever undertaken in the country.
We could say that it is the most efficient in terms of other works, but of course, we live in
Colombia, a country full of corruption. This makes most of the civil works splash in over
costs and delays as it is the tunnel of La Linea. In this article, we summarize what the work
has been, and we focus more on the delays and failures of this work, and what has produced
them. We relate the catastrophe to this work as it is a synonym of the former because it is a
great catastrophe. This work, which makes the country and all Colombians look bad, gives us
to understand how the country is, and that if we don’t put an end to this filth called corruption,
everything will be a hecatomb.
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El túnel de La Línea es una de las obras civiles más grandes que se han hecho en el
país. Podríamos decir que es la más eficiente en cuanto a otras obras, pero claro vivimos
en Colombia, un país lleno de corrupción. Esto hace que la mayoría de las obras civiles
resulte salpicada en sobre costos y retrasos como lo es el túnel de La Línea. En este artículo
resumimos lo que ha sido la obra, y nos enfocamos más que todo en los retrasos y fallas de
esta obra, y que los han producido. Relacionamos la hecatombe con esta obra ya que es un
sinónimo de aquella, porque es una gran catástrofe. Esta obra, que hace quedar mal al país y a
todos los colombianos, nos da a entender cómo está el país, y que si no damos fin a esa mugre
llamada corrupción, todo será una hecatombe.
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Introduction
One of the great internal problems of most countries
that cost millions of dollars a year, involve crimes
such as corruption, bribery and other types of
influence within governments and entities responsible
for contracting works and public good projects
(Cirilovic, Vajdic, Mladenovic, & Queiroz, 2014; Limam,
2012; Rose, 2008; Walcher, Stempkowski, & Apfalter,
2012). These problems are seen even more in societies
with little respect for the common good, with instruments
of vigilance in the hands of people not suited to the
positions and great concentrations of money in few hands
(Andreescu, 2016; Clem, 2011; Herath, 2015; Loomis, 2010;
Meduri & Annamalai, 2013).
The La Línea tunnel is a civil construction project located
in the departments of Tolima and Quindío. This work
consists of the main tunnel of 29.5 km, 21 bridges, 24
viaducts, 2 depressed and an initial budget in 2004 (the
year when it began to be realized) of 629,000 million pesos,
but that up to the moment has ascended to $1.27 billion
Colombian pesos. The bidding process and subsequent
award for the execution were granted to the consortium
Segundo Centenario by the National Government in 2008,
and it was intended to be completed in July 2014. In
principle, no delays were expected in the work, but now it
is expected that this work was delivered in November this
year and that by 2018 it will be fully operational.
The director of INVIAS (National Institute of Roads),
Carlos García Montes, informed that it is expected that the
crossing of the central mountain range (La Línea tunnel) will
be delivered on November 30th, 2017 and that it will be fully
operational in the first period of 2018 when the five contracts
that make up one of the most ambitious mega-projects
currently underway in the country should be completed.
In recent public statements, the Intertunel consortium has
said: "We as engineers think that they will have to honor
this commitment and deliver the work to the country in 12
months".
Description of the project
The La Línea tunnel is one of the most important road
projects being executed in Colombia, since it is the road that
aims to facilitate traffic on National Route 40 (a route that
crosses the country from East to West from Buena Aventura
to Puerto Carreño), hence its importance. This will make the
country’s capitals more connected to the sea ports located
in Buena Aventura, which will generate more profits for the
country (Fig. 1).
This project is divided into four modules and six sections.
Figure 1. La Línea Tunnel profile.
Modules
The following is a list of the progress made by each
according to information from INVIAS. The first module is
the main tunnel of 8.6 km that has several fronts in which the
progress is different. Here the different fronts and their level
of progress will be presented.
• Fault treatment 66%.
• The concrete lining of the tunnel walls 60%.
• Paving of the track 27%.
The second module, which has 8.89 km of construction
for the second roadway, has 13 bridges, and the percentage
of progress is as follows.
• Bridge raising has a progress level of 88%.
• Annexed works at 96%.
The third module includes 11 bridges and five tunnels,
which have a progress level of 80%. The fourth module
includes annexed works and the completion of other
alternative routes, which is only 58% complete. These
include the Pilotó Tunnel and a tunnel parallel to the main
one.
We can say that in the total of the work it is necessary
to complete 46% of annexed works, 32% of the lifting of
bridges and tunnels, 40% of concrete resentment in the
tunnels, 34% of the treatment of faults and 73% of paving in
the track of the first module. What makes us think that this
work has not been executed normally because of the failures
and promises that have put the country in bad reviews.
Sections
• Section 1: Buenaventura - Buga (Invias, 2013).
• Section 2: Buga - La Paila (in concession).
• Section 3: La Paila - Armenia - Calarcá (in concession).
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• Section 4: Calarcá - Cajamarca (of which La Línea
Tunnel is part).
• Section 5: Cajamarca - Girardot (in concession).
• Section 6: Girardot - Bogotá (in concession).
Carlos Collins, the first contractor of the La Línea tunnel
at the age of 77, and a well-known infrastructure builder in
Colombia, with the Segundo Centenario temporary union, is
fighting a battle against the state for the breach of contract.
To complete 12% of the project, contractors Conconcretó and
Carlos Solarte won the tender. It must be said that Carlos
Collins had budgeted for the remaining 12% $255 billion and
not $363 billion proposed by the new contractors (Fig. 2).
Figure 2. La Línea tunnel (Invias, 2013).
The construction of the site in the advance that it was
would not be reversed. On July 13, 2007, the Infrastructure
Guild sent a letter to Andrés Uriel Gallego, dismayed at the
error this would imply, and proposing to analyze a second
option, to bet on two one-way twin tunnels. The reason was
reduced to issues of competitiveness, the fact of having two
tunnels would not only guarantee greater vehicle capacity but
would also be compatible with the double roadway scheme
planned for the Bogotá-Buenaventura corridor.
There was no response to this letter. The country’s
engineers insisted on studying the possibility of inviting
tenders for the construction of two tunnels in a single
contract. They also proposed to Gallego to have
public-private participation given the interest of local and
foreign investors. The union asked to verify the budget of
the work rigorously, including the sections of the double
roadway between Cajamarca and Calarcá, contemplated in
the project by the decision of the Government. The union
concluded that the project in its entirety (the two tunnels plus
the sections of the second roadway) bordered the 1.2 billion
pesos with a value of 2007, that value was less than what the
bidding proposed.
As the years went by, something gave the play a new
lease of life. It happened during the government of Andrés
Pastrana when the president created the Conpes 3084 in
2000, which authorized the Nation to contract external
credits up to 218 million dollars to finance the tunnel and
build it at 2,520 meters above sea level. However, this
proposal drowned and was not carried out. It was not because
of money issues, but because of the lack of performance
guarantee policies to support the idea. This scenario revealed
what a hecatomb this tunnel was. Then the government of
Alvaro Uribe Velez came to take control of the work. The
Minister of Transport at that time, Andrés Uriel Gallego,
announced, in agreement with the Japanese years ago, the
decision to build the tunnel in the highest part of the
mountain range, which would be "less tedious" (Fig. 3).
Figure 3. La Linea construction (Ejatlas, 2016).
The pilot tunnel
The pilot tunnel, with a final length of 8.5 km and a
diameter of 4.4 m, parallel to the main tunnel, is a rescue
work, which is part of the Segundo Centenario Tunnels. It
was built to establish the geological risk of the area and
determine the process of execution of the tunnel.
Benefits of the pilot tunnel
• Quantification of geological risk, such as failures,
characterization, yields, etc.
• Lower costs of the main tunnels at the design level.
• Knowledge of hydrogeology, stabilization of
equipotential flow lines, stable infiltration flows.
• Higher performance due to better knowledge and
drained conditions.
• Different excavation fronts of the first Main Tunnel.
• Pre-treatment of identified fault zones.
• Better planning and programming of material and
machinery supply.
• Benefit of the Pilot Tunnel, as a rescue tunnel.
• Discarding of volcanic incidence.
Main factors affecting the civil works
This work has presented delays in the Quindío due to the
liquidation of the insurance company Cóndor that issued the
policies of the fulfillment of the work. The problem began
when the Calarcá aqueduct system presented contamination
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in its waters, geological faults that were thought not to be so
great.
In November 2015 a geological fault in the pilot tunnel
reached greater delays than those mentioned above since,
also, it must be taken into account that the work is close to
the Machin volcano in Tolima, which causes this instability.
According to Carlos Collins, a former contractor of the
work, there was another factor due to the trucker’s strike
that stopped the project from being carried out for 60 days.
The last one was generated in December 2015, when the
Quindío Regional Autonomous Corporation (CRQ) found
that the permits approved to INVIAS, for the execution of
the external works, were not in order (Fig. 4).
Figure 4. Works in the La Linea tunnel (El Espectador,
2017).
Factors affecting road works in Colombia
The president of the Colombian Society of Engineers,
Daniel Florez Perez, and of the Colombian Chamber of
Infrastructure, Juan Martin Caicedo, take as the most
important factors affecting road works in the country the
following:
1. Insufficient studies and project designs. To be able to
advance the contracting of civil works, before the bidding
process, the public entity must have basic engineering
information.
2. Lack of infrastructure planning. Problems due to poor
planning or clarity of land use or infrastructure.
3. Deficiency in the elaboration of budgets for public
works. The more information and detail in the study and
designs prior to the work, the less uncertainty there is in the
final cost.
4. Delays in meeting the obligations of social and
environmental management in the projects. Environmental
and social management inconveniences which affect
communities and create social or environmental impacts
from the project under construction, such as untimely debris
management.
5. Delays in the acquisition of land for the projects. The
delay in the purchase and delivery of project land is one of
the main factors affecting the delay in road works.
6. Lack of inter-institutional coordination. The delay in
the processing of licenses and permits of contracting entities
such as environmental authorities suffer delays, taking much
more than the required time and in many cases the extra cost
for the elaboration of the work.
7. Deficiencies in social management with communities.
Social management in construction projects is very deficient.
This generates the discontent of social groups that can turn
into protests that end up affecting the execution of the project.
8. Distortion of the work of the auditing office.
Contracting and public entities rely on audits to generate
more paperwork, value to the project, and strengthen
coordination between the contractor and the contracting
party.
Colombia in road infrastructure
Colombia currently lags in terms of road infrastructure by
more than 30 years. Speaking of roads, it is 30% below the
level it should be. Globally, Colombia ranks 126th in terms
of national road infrastructure in 2016, being one of the worst
qualified countries, not only in Latin America but worldwide.
This year it climbed 16 places from 126th to 110th.
Similarly, in 2017, Colombia has built 2,350 kilometers
of dual carriageways, while in 2014 it was 1,796 kilometers,
2,052 kilometers in 2015, and 2,293 kilometers in 2016
(table 1).
Table 1
Road Infrastructure quality ranking (Sectorial, 2014).
Occupational safety for workers in civil works in
Colombia
Workers who work in civil works are exposed to risks
such as exposure to cold, heat, and extreme temperatures,
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this is because most of the time they are working outdoors.
Also, they must perform work at high altitudes that puts
them at great risk, and they may suffer a fall. They work
with equipment, some of which are dangerous if you do
not have prior knowledge of how to operate the equipment.
Sometimes they suffer from fatigue as they have shifts of
up to 12 hours. They work near heavy machinery, which
can cause them to be slightly deafened by the loud noise of
the machines. Finally, in Colombia, the occupational safety
of the workers needs to be put into context, both by the
construction companies and by the workers themselves who
are exposed (Fig. 5).
Figure 5. Protests by workers in the La Línea tunnel
(El Tiempo, 2014).
The problems that the mega work had due to budget and
environmental policies have made this work to have many
delays. To make a comparison, the main environmental
problems that occurred in the construction of Colombian
tunnels and the environmental delays of the La Línea tunnel
are discussed.
Frequent environmental problems in road tunnel
construction
The main environmental conditions, common to any
construction process, generated or induced by a road tunnel
project, are the effects on fauna, flora, landscape, soil, water,
air, as well as the social and health effects due to pollution
(environmental contamination by industrial waste) and other
harmful materials.
Affects to the fauna. The most common effects on the
fauna in a civil work are basic problems in the face of
the need to build there the original habitat of the fauna.
Affections to the flora. This type of affectations is the
removal of the flora (plants, trees, excavations, and
deformations of mountain systems, etc.), which is
done according to the environmental policies in force
for the execution of the work.
Effect on water sources. The most common effects on
water sources are in the pollution, elimination,
and consumption of lakes, wetlands, rivers, etc.
surrounding the work in progress. This is done by
resolving and obtaining environmental permits for the
execution of this work.
Airborne affectations. The effects on the air surrounding
the work in progress are pollution, the production of
high-impact odors, and the production of harmful gase
Affections to the community surrounding the work.
Breathing problems in children and the elderly due to
pollution, possible deterioration of the structures of
the houses surrounding the tracks, mobility problems
in terms of partial or total closure of the tracks, among
others.
Environmental problems in the La Línea tunnel
The works in La Línea, besides the budget problem, have
also suspended work due to environmental damage.
Contamination of water sources. It was given by the bad
process of elimination of industrial residues, and its
contamination to the hydric sources. Concrete cases
include San Rafael Creek, La Gata Creek, and the
El Salado tributary, which caused INVIAS to suspend
discharges in several areas of Calcará.
La Gata stream. In March 2007, the Corporación
Autónoma Regional del Quindío granted a five-year
discharge permit over La Gata stream to the partner
Conlínea, and although it was granted to INVÍAS in
2009, it expired in 2012 and has not been renewed.
El Salado stream. More than 80 thousand inhabitants of
Calarcá (Quindío) lost the El Salado stream, the main
water source that supplied their aqueduct.
High investments in water recovery. $8,622,155,911
Colombian pesos were used, which corresponds to
approximately 1% of the budget of the value of the
contract used for water recovery and management.
This budget was used for domestic wastewater
treatment, soil erosion, environmental training for
communities, etc.
Budget problems in the La Línea tunnel
In addition to the environmental problems, there are
budget delays. Complaints by dozens of workers who
claim to have fallen ill as a result of the construction work,
investigations, legal proceedings, fines, and sanctions that
have not managed to stop the damage caused in Quindío.
There are legal problems regarding the omission of the
cessation of permits for discharges into water sources and
their pollution which expired in 2012. The remaining works
are 3 km of the lining of the main tunnel, nine bridges with
average progress of 70%, and four short tunnels.
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The Superior Council of Fiscal Policy approved $133
billion of the 2018 INVIAS term to open the contract to
finish the remaining 12% of the Line’s tunnel, which would
be awarded on June 13, 2017.
Lawsuits were filed for the violation of the collective
rights and the environment of the inhabitants of Calarcá.
The Defender of the People in Quindío, Piedad Correal
Rubiano, filed a popular action that the Administrative Court
of Quindío admitted and ruled in 2012, against INVIAS and
the contractor of the tunnel works, UTSC, for the pollution
generated in the creeks.
On April 15, 2014, the Unión Temporal Segundo
Centenario, represented by Carlos Collins, filed an
arbitration claim with the Arbitration and Conciliation
Center of the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce against the
Instituto Nacional de Vías INVIAS (National Institute of
Railways), to obtain recognition of the price difference it had
to assume as a result of a change in the material used for
lining the tunnel of La Línea.
The completion of the remaining works is based on five
contracts and a technical, legal and financial analysis, in
which INVIAS did not accept the request for extension made
by the Unión Temporal Segundo Centenario (UTSC), whose
contract expired on 30 November 2016, the date agreed for
the completion of the works.
Machinery was sold to guarantee payment to 87 former
workers of the Carlos Collins S.A. consortium of the
Segundo Centenario temporary union, due to the insolvency
after the judicial liquidation of the construction company.
Also, in July 2017 there is a cost overrun of 363 billion
Colombian pesos more than 57% of the initial cost.
Works attached to the tunnel
These are the advances in terms of the annexed works
for access to the main tunnel, which cost 45,468 million
Colombian pesos (Fig. 6).
• Estrella tunnel: 326.5m (100%) finished.
• Robles tunnel: 841.40m (95.08%).
• Los Chorros Tunnel: 209.20m (33.96%).
• Estrella bridge 1: progress is made on the bridge plate.
• Estrella bridge 3: provisional embankments were
formed.
• Robles bridge 2: progress was made in the assembly of
beams for the construction of the slab.
• Alaska bridge: progress has been made in the assembly
of beams for the construction of the slab.
At present, the Abbreviated Selection process was opened
for the contracting of the Studies and Designs, Social,
Property and Environmental Management, Construction and
Operation of the Project "Crossing the Central Mountain
Range: II Centenary Tunnels - Line Tunnel and Second
Calarcá Roadway - Cajamarca", worth $703,000 million.
Figure 6. Works attached to the tunnel (Icconstructores,
2017).
Contractors
The formation of the Unión Temporal Segundo
Centenario consortium is as follows: Condux S.A. de
CV, Constructora Herreña Fronpeca, Constructora Carlos
Collins S.A., Álvarez y Collins S.A., PromotoraMontecarlos
Vías S.A., Túneles de Colombia S.A., Construirte Ltda.,
Gayco S.A., Tecnicíviles S.A., HyH Arquitectura S.A., and
Miguel Camilo Castillo Huertas. The Minister of Transport,
Andrés Uriel Gallego Henao and the Director General of the
National Roads Institute, Daniel Andrés García, awarded
the contract to the consortium Unión Temporal Segundo
Centenario.
The consortium is made up of two Spanish companies,
one Mexican and eight Colombian, and obtained a score of
1,000 points in the order of eligibility, by offering to execute
the four modules into which the work is divided, for a value
of $629,052’989,746 in the period established by the entity
of 70 months.
INVIAS, due to the non-compliance of contracts of
the works contemplated in contract 3460 of 2008, by the
contractors of the temporary union Segundo Centenario,
finished on November 30, 2016, and not extended, is looking
for new contractors and the generation of a new contract.
The Superior Council of Fiscal Policy (Confis), for the year
2018 approves a future term that grants 133,000 million
pesos, to contract the execution of 12% of the remaining
works for the tunnel. For this it has $249,000 million, said
the General Director of the National Roads Institute, Carlos
Garcia Montes.
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The Minister of Transport, Jorge Eduardo Rojas, and
through INVIAS, requested, on behalf of the National
Government to Confis, the approval of $144,000 million
for 2018 to complete these works, therefore the remaining
$11,000million to complete the required budget of $249,000
million, will come from national resources of the present
period (Figs. 7 and 8).
Figure 7. Radiography of the tunnel.
The Intertunel Consortium was the winner within the
framework of the process CMA-DO-GTL-090-2016, whose
purpose is the audit for the completion of the project
Crossing the Central Mountain Range - Line Tunnel and
Second Calarcá-Cajamarca Roadway. This was announced
by the Ministry of Transport through INVIAS.
The Intertunel consortium is made up of the firms
R&Q ingeniería Colombia S.A, with 40% (Chile), Saitec
branch Colombia with 30% (Spain), and Joyco S.A.S with
30% (Colombia). The company competed with 11 other
companies, and with it, the national government completed
the awarding process for the completion of 12% of the
remaining works for this project.
INVIAS awarded the Consortium the execution of the
works for which it submitted a bid for $224,407 million, and
not the $249,000 million agreed by Carlos Collins. Thus,
the contractor Intertunel with this contract will be in charge
of almost $250,000 million, which will be distributed as
follows: $62,000 for geological faults, $21,000 for short
tunnels, $50,000 for remaining viaducts, $56,000 for the
tunnel lining, $24,000 for paving, and $36,000 for open-air
works.
The General Director of INVIAS, Carlos García, asked
for speed in the works to finish them as soon as possible and
Figure 8. Projects at risk due to expiration (La Republica,
2017).
underlined that the commitment of the Entity is to finish the
projects that it is in charge of.
Value of the work
The cost of the project, initially agreed in approximately
629 billion pesos, as of July 2017 has already exceeded that
value, being in the order of 1.27 trillion pesos. Also, there are
different additional to add as the settlements and demands.
The Control Office is going to take action on the case by
going to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, as these values are
lacking in fines, environmental damage, and observations
made by the auditor of the work. The control office says
the deadline, which expired on November 30 last year, was
extended by 39 months, a 50 percent extension. These
changes affect the execution of the work and the budgeting
of equipment for it.
The control office says that it will continue this project
until it is finished, which is why it summarized that the La
Linea tunnel project is going to cost more and take longer
than expected.
Problems with workers in the La Línea tunnel
In this work, several problems have arisen in which the
main protagonists are the workers. The problems range from
delays in salary payments to deaths. Within 45 days, the
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workers were not paid, causing more than a hundred workers
to go on strike and block the Pan-American Highway. To
solve this problem, the mayor of Calarcá at that time, Juan
Carlos Giraldo, intervened so that the workers would retract
and reach an agreement, in order to make the contract valid.
In August 2011 a worker was killed and two others injured
in the Alpes 1 sector, when they were drilling a part of
the central mountain range, and doing other work. At that
time a landslide came over them, burying several workers.
Miraculously, some of them escaped unharmed, and the two
injured were taken to the Santa Lucia de Cajamarca hospital.
These problems are due to the poor organization in terms of
occupational risks, and the lack of training to be able to avoid
this case of emergency.
The lack of compliance with contracts, geological faults,
and environmental problems, are the causes of this work that
have a delay of four years.
Contract
Contract No. 3460 of 2008 by the contractors Unión
Temporal Segundo Centenario, led by Carlos Collins
Espoleta, had as its objective the study and design of social
management of property and environment, construction and
operation of the project "crossing the central mountain
range: tunnels of the II centenary - tunnel of the line and
second roadway Calarcá - Cajamarca". The term to comply
with this contract was 70 months (eight months of papers,
46 months of the construction stage, and 16 months for
maintenance, from the date of commencement of the contract
on April 14, 2009. The contract was signed for a value of
629,052,989,746 Colombian pesos.
Contractual non-compliance
INVIAS declared the partial breach by the contractors
of the Temporary Union Segundo Centenario. According
to INVIAS, during the execution of the contract for
the La Línea tunnel, in September 2014, the controller
recommended the initiation of administrative proceedings
to sanction the alleged serious breach of obligations and to
declare the expiration of Contract No. 3460 of 2008. In
addition to the above, INVIAS, guaranteeing the contractor’s
right to due process and defense in the respective auditor’s
report, reached agreements, and it was even necessary to
reschedule the work schedule. Therefore, the UTSC must
pay at least 16,133 million pesos, because according to
the INVIAS institute, the contract was not fulfilled due to
environmental failures and the non-delivery of the work in
the mentioned period (70 months).
The environmental licence
In the 2008 contract, the environmental license is ordinary,
i.e. it does not include the permits, concessions, and
authorizations for the use of natural resources required for
the project, such as the execution of activities such as
the exploitation of sources of materials, disposal of excess
material from excavations, exploitation of water sources,
whether surface or underground, temporary or permanent
occupation of watercourses, dumping, etc. These permits
must be managed and obtained from the environmental
authorities in the area of jurisdiction by the contractors.
In March 2007, the Corporación Autónoma Regional
del Quindío granted a five-year discharge permit for the
La Gata stream to the partner, and although it was
granted to INVIAS in 2009, it expired in 2012 and
was not renewed, but the discharge continued during
2013. The Council of State confirmed the ruling of
the Quindío Administrative Court declaring INVIAS, the
National Environmental Licensing Agency (Anla), the
Quindío Regional Autonomous Corporation (CRQ), the
intervening consortium and the company in charge of the
construction of the La Línea tunnel responsible for the
environmental damage caused by the lack of compliance and
the contamination of the La Gata stream and the El Salado
affluent.
This demand was for the maintenance of the water and
its good use, so it was decided to use more than 1% of
the value of the contract for the purification of these water
sources of Quindio. The analysis of the evidence reveals that
the contamination comes from the construction of viaducts,
poor management of sludge, stagnation of wastewater, and
earthworks on the double roadway Calarcá - Cajamarca. The
main sector affected is the El Salado viaduct, because there
has been concrete leakage during the construction of the
infrastructure, which is dumped in the San Rafael stream.
The most affected by this lawsuit are the contractors,
UTSC and INVIAS, since one is in charge of carrying
out the environmental licenses and the other is responsible
for evaluation, control, prevention, and monitoring. The
Corporación Autónoma Regional del Quindío (CRQ) found
that the permits approved to INVIAS, to carry out the
external works, were not in order.
Payment of salaries
To guarantee the payment of salaries, social benefits, and
compensations of the personnel that the Contractor is to use
for the execution of the Contract, a value equivalent to five
percent (5%) of the Contract Value, with a validity of 9 years,
was held. This was not complied with, and the payment to
87 former workers of the consortium Carlos Collins S.A.
of the temporary union of Segundo Centenario had to be
supported with the sale of machinery, generating extra costs
to the work.
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INVIAS and contractor
Carlos Collins claims that only 76%was delivered to carry
out the 88% that today make up the work, but INVIAS
contradicts him, saying that in the contracts it appears that
more than that 88% was delivered. Also, the contractor
assures that there were cost overruns and delays due to the
value of materials and stoppages presented in Quindio.
Extensions for Carlos Collins
According to INVAS, as it has been stated in the
follow-up process agreed between the Government and the
businessman Carlos Collins, the legal representative of the
contractor firm, Unión Temporal Segundo Centenario, the
execution of the works was being carried out. Therefore,
Carlos Collins requested extensions for the completion of the
work, since the problem was budgetary, and it was expected
that the work would be completed by the date stipulated by a
conciliation agreement of March 2016 between the Ministry
of Transport and the contractor. This agreement resulted
in the project receiving 327 billion pesos from different
sources. Of these resources, the contractor contributed 30
billion pesos, and a beneficiary was established, which would
manage the resources. This would allow the construction
of the missing bridges and tunnels, and conclude the works
before November 30th, 2016. But after four extensions
issued, INVIAS decided not to grant a fifth, since it was
not sure the completion of this in the four months requested
by the contractor because the monthly progress was less
than 1%. INVIAS, stated that the reasons for this decision
were the impossibility of finishing the construction of the
work in the foreseen time of construction, the lack of
economic resources, and materials to finish the work, as
well as noncompliance with environmental and technical
specifications.
The builder requested a first extension of four months in
March 2012, then three months in October 2012, 12 months
in September 2013 and 20 months in April 2015. Previously
the work had taken 46 months, which in principle was set for
85 months.
Geological faults
The La Línea tunnel is made up of eight geological faults,
noticed by the Veeduría Técnica Especializada. Among them
are La Gata, La Soledad, and El Viento. The most difficult
to control are in Quindío. These faults imply support and
concrete injection to guarantee safety in the tunnel. The
contractor, by not attending to all the faults, helped delay
the work (Fig. 9).
The report also pointed out that after the lining of the II
Centenary Tunnel, some stretches of the tunnel are covered
by infiltrated water. This also has to do with the poor
environmentalmanagement of this work. Therefore, Orjuela,
Figure 9. Water pollution from the construction site
(Cronica del Quindio, 2017).
president of the Society of Engineers of Quindio, warned the
contractor UTSC to correct this situation and to verify the
waterproofing procedure because this cannot happen in the
tunnel after the conclusion of the works.
The mountain where the La Línea tunnel will be built,
which will connect central Colombia to the Pacific more
quickly, as it is in an area affected by geological faults and
close to the Machín volcano in the central mountain range,
is a work that is being transformed every day and requires
permanent monitoring. In addition to these faults, the central
mountain range has weaknesses and fractures, where the
material is very loose since it is composed of metamorphic
rocks reworked and at some point, could affect the structure
of the tunnel, such as the arches and the stabilization itself.
Collapses in the tunnel
In the maintenance of the La Línea tunnel, the National
Institute of Roads (INVIAS) is working hard with machinery
and personnel from the depletable amount contract to restore
the passage on the Cajamarca-Calarcá (Alto de La Línea)
road, affected by several landslides after the increase in
rainfall in that part of the country. According to García
Montes, general director of INVIAS, in Tolima they worked
with a backhoe, four dump trucks, and a loader, while on the
Quindío side they had two backhoes, two loaders, and four
dump trucks, to attend to the emergency (Fig. 10).
Carlos added that, also, the respective road administration
and the group of micro-entrepreneurs under his charge are
involved, to achieve in the shortest time possible the removal
of the landslides that interrupt the passage at the height of
kilometers 36, 38, 39 and 40.
New contract for the completion of the tunnel
The Intertunel consortium is still on track to deliver the
works in December 2018, but the delay in the publication of
the process to choose the new contractor put at risk that this
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Figure 10. Work to enable the passage through La Línea
(Invias, 2017).
commitment could be achieved. The process to choose the
new contractor was based on the fact that nobody wanted to
take the risk of finishing the tunnel due to three problems:
time, resources, and environmental license.
The UTSC, whose contract expired on November 30,
2016, after being granted four extensions that represented an
additional 39 months, delivers the project with an 88 percent
progress, so the Intertunel consortium will have an official
budget of more than $238 billion, and will have an execution
period of 12 months.
A geological fault in 2015 in the pilot tunnel reached
greater proportions than the environmental ones. A zone
of geological instability found was greater than had been
reported, thus extending the delay of the work by six months.
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